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United States Courts and Imperialism
David H. Moore*
Abstract
When U.S. Courts adjudicate transnational matters, they risk
two forms of judicial imperialism. The first—unilateral
imperialism—involves adjudication by a single state at the
expense of multilateral forms of resolution or global governance.
The second—sovereigntist imperialism—threatens the sovereignty
of other states who might wish to resolve the controversy
themselves. The risk of imperialism may lead U.S. courts to
hesitate to adjudicate transnational claims. In Foreign
Governments as Plaintiffs in U.S. Courts and the Case Against
“Judicial Imperialism,” Professor Hannah Buxbaum highlights
that in addition to facing involuntary adjudication in U.S. courts,
foreign states voluntarily sue in U.S. courts as well. The
phenomenon of foreign states as plaintiffs, she argues, undermines
concerns for imperialism and counsels in favor of U.S. judicial
resolution of transnational matters.
Buxbaum’s focus on foreign states as plaintiffs is an
important contribution. The implications of the focus, however,
are more circumscribed than her article might suggest. The fact
that foreign states occasionally sue in U.S. courts means that
adjudication of transnational claims by U.S. courts does not
always constitute unilateral imperialism. Rather, suits by foreign
states may be a form of global governance. When it comes to
concerns for sovereigntist imperialism, by contrast, foreign
invocation of U.S. jurisdiction fails to undermine the sovereignty
concerns that arise when U.S. courts adjudicate against the will of
foreign states. First, the typical claims foreign states assert as
plaintiffs themselves show respect for sovereignty. Second, consent
matters, and in nonconsensual cases sovereignty concerns
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continue to exist. Third, notions of reciprocity do not automatically
justify involuntary adjudication due to foreign state invocation of
U.S. jurisdiction. More is needed to conclude that the phenomenon
of foreign states as plaintiffs justifies adjudication against the will
of those states.
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Resolution of transnational controversies in U.S. courts risks
two forms of judicial imperialism. First, adjudication of
transnational controversies in the courts of one country—the
United States—threatens unilateral rather than multilateral
governance of transnational matters. This unilateral imperialism
elevates governance by a single state over multilateral
approaches to governance. Second, the exercise of U.S.
sovereignty to resolve transnational controversies threatens the
sovereignty of other states that share ties to a controversy and
might wish to exercise their sovereignty to resolve the
controversy themselves. This sovereigntist imperialism elevates
the sovereignty of one state over that of others.1 The risk of either
form of imperialism, but especially the sovereigntist version, may
1. Both forms of imperialism are international in nature. That is, both
focus on the international impacts of U.S. adjudication, whether for global
governance or for the co-equal sovereignty of other states. Judicial resolution of
transnational matters might also present a domestic form of imperialism as
courts exercise authority reserved to the political branches. Buxbaum makes
brief reference to this form of imperialism, but focuses on international
imperialism. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Foreign Governments as Plaintiffs in
U.S. Courts and the Case Against “Judicial Imperialism”, 73 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 653, 705–06 (2016) (noting separation of powers concerns arising from
judicial resolution of transnational matters). This response maintains that focus
as well.
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lead U.S. courts to hesitate to resolve transnational matters like
domestic matters by, for example, invoking the political question
or act of state doctrine or applying a strong presumption against
extraterritoriality. In Foreign Governments as Plaintiffs in U.S.
Courts and the Case Against “Judicial Imperialism,”2 Professor
Hannah Buxbaum explores the phenomenon of foreign states
bringing suit in U.S. courts to argue that charges of judicial
imperialism leveled at U.S. courts are overblown such that U.S.
courts should be more receptive to transnational litigation.
Buxbaum makes an important contribution. Notions of
judicial imperialism are predominately informed by a
paradigmatic scenario in which U.S. courts exercise jurisdiction
against the actual or presumed will of other states. Against this
paradigm, Buxbaum reminds that other states also invoke the
jurisdiction of U.S. courts. The engagement of foreign states with
U.S. courts is thus broader than the paradigmatic case intimates.
This is an important insight. Yet the implications of this insight
are more limited than Buxbaum suggests, especially when it
comes to the sovereigntist brand of judicial imperialism.
I. Relative Frequency
As an initial matter, claims by foreign states as plaintiffs
“constitute a small percentage of all litigation involving foreign
sovereign parties.”3 Indeed, searching the Westlaw “cases”
database (which includes cases that predate the Founding) as
well as the “trial court documents” database (which generally
contains only documents from 2000 onward), Buxbaum finds
fewer than 300 claims by foreign states in U.S. courts.4 The more
common contexts in which foreign states engage with U.S. courts
are “(1) when a foreign government is the defendant in a U.S.
court . . . ; (2) when a claim requires a U.S. court to scrutinize
2. While Buxbaum speaks of suits by foreign governments, I find it more
natural to speak in terms of suits by foreign states, although such suits will be
brought by the recognized governments of those states.
3. Buxbaum, supra note 1, at 659. This is due in part to limitations on
foreign state standing to sue in U.S. courts. See id. at 659–65.
4. See id. at 653–54, 666 (discussing these Westlaw findings). Buxbaum
explains that “these data are necessarily incomplete,” but represent “as full a
set as possible of claims brought by foreign governments.” Id. at 666.
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actions taken by a foreign government within its own
borders . . . ; and (3) when a U.S. court seeks to apply U.S. law to
persons or conduct within a foreign government’s borders . . . .”5
In all these cases, the risk of a U.S. court infringing on the
sovereignty of a foreign state or engaging in unilateral rather
than multilateral resolution of the dispute is real.
The risk may be reduced if foreign states accept U.S.
adjudication in these cases. In all three of the more common
contexts in which foreign states interact with the U.S. judiciary,
foreign states may accede to U.S. adjudication. For example,
when a foreign state appears as a defendant in U.S. courts, the
state may waive its immunity.6 Similarly, a state may consent to
the application of U.S. law to actors and events within its
borders.7 The incentives that may lead a state to waive immunity
or consent to U.S. exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction may differ
from the incentives that lead a state to sue in U.S. courts. A state
might waive jurisdictional immunity, for example, long before a
suit materializes in order to secure a favorable business deal. Yet
these situations are also relevant to an assessment of foreign
states’ comfort with U.S. adjudication. In this regard, Foreign
Governments as Plaintiffs provides an insightful starting point
for a broader analysis of the ways in which foreign states
welcome the involvement of U.S. courts in transnational
matters.8
II. Respect for Sovereignty When Foreign States Sue as Plaintiffs
When it comes to the cases in which foreign states sue as
plaintiffs, these cases reflect concern for sovereignty. Foreign

5. Id.at 655 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
6. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (“A
foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United
States or of the States in any case . . . in which the foreign state has waived its
immunity either explicitly or by implication . . . .”).
7. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 201 cmt. k (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016).
8. See Buxbaum, supra note 1, at 659 (noting additional situations in
which foreign states consent to U.S. adjudication, while focusing on the
phenomenon of foreign states as plaintiffs).
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states bring roughly five types of claims in U.S. courts.9 Three
types—“[c]laims related to assets located within the territory of
the United States,”10 “[c]laims for monetary relief in connection
with commercial activity in the United States or involving U.S.
counterparties,”11 and “[r]equests for judicial assistance in
connection with foreign judicial or arbitral proceedings”12—echo
the international law rule that states have sovereign authority to
regulate “persons, property, and conduct within [their]
territory.”13 Whether or not these claims directly present
questions of U.S. jurisdiction to prescribe, lodging these claims in
U.S. courts demonstrates respect for the sovereignty of the
United States over its territory and people. Similarly, requests to
support foreign arbitral or judicial proceedings generally rely on
treaties to which the United States has consented or statutes the
United States has enacted in its sovereign discretion.14 These
requests often ask the United States to perform tasks that would
be an infringement of sovereignty for another state to attempt
within U.S. territory, such as gather evidence.15
A fourth (and relatively uncommon) type of claim—“[c]laims
for injunctive relief following alleged treaty violations by a U.S.
municipality or state, or by the federal government”16—also
demonstrates respect for U.S. sovereignty. As with claims to
support foreign proceedings, these claims rely on treaties to
which the United States has consented. Bringing these claims in
U.S. courts allows the United States, rather than a foreign or
even international tribunal, to assess the legality of U.S. conduct
and alter its ways. The fifth set of claims—“[c]laims for monetary
relief for damages suffered in connection with unlawful conduct
occurring within the foreign state”—invites the United States to
9. Id. at 666–67.
10. Id. at 666. Some of these claims extend to property located outside the
United States and thereby reach beyond invocation of U.S. territorial
sovereignty. Id. at 669.
11. Id. at 666.
12. Id.
13. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 212 (Tentative Draft 2, 2016).
14. Buxbaum, supra note 1, at 670–71, 677.
15. Id. at 670–71.
16. Id. at 666, 673.
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exercise sovereign power in situations where it otherwise might
not, such as where foreign defendants acted within the territory
of the suing state.17 To the extent that these claims seek
enforcement of U.S. law,18 they are consistent with the
international law principle that a state may exercise its
sovereignty to consent to the application of another state’s law
beyond what international law would otherwise allow.19
In short, respect for sovereignty is evident in the five
categories of claims that foreign states pursue as plaintiffs in
U.S. courts.20 Consequently, the fact that foreign states invoke
U.S. jurisdiction may, on balance, strengthen rather than
undermine concerns for sovereigntist imperialism.
III. Invocation Versus Imposition
At a minimum, foreign states’ occasional invocation of U.S.
jurisdiction has little or no direct bearing on concerns for
sovereigntist imperialism. The same is not true when it comes to
concerns for unilateral imperialism. Consensual interactions
between foreign states and U.S. courts reveal—as Buxbaum
usefully highlights in the context of foreign states as plaintiffs—
that what might at first blush appear to be unilateralism is in
fact multilateral use of U.S. courts. In this way, Buxbaum’s focus
on foreign states as plaintiffs shows that U.S. adjudication of
transnational claims is not always unilateral imperialism but
global governance. Yet this insight is qualified. As Buxbaum
notes, developing states may resort to U.S. courts because they
17. Id. at 667, 675–77. Buxbaum includes in this fifth set claims against
U.S. corporations, id. at 675–76, a form of suit discussed previously. See supra
text accompanying note 11.
18. See Buxbaum, supra note 1, at 675 (noting that “some [foreign states]
assert claims pursuant to foreign law, while others are brought under U.S.
law[,] including various forms of regulatory law”).
19. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 201 cmt. k (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016).
20. This does not mean that the United States always exercises its
sovereignty to assist foreign states with their claims. Even when foreign states
seek U.S. adjudication, U.S. courts may decline to oblige, including based on
imperialism concerns. See Buxbaum, supra note 1, at 696–98 (discussing
situations in which U.S. courts have refused to adjudicate claims by foreign
state plaintiffs).
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lack the ability to resolve transnational matters on their own.21
Theirs is not so much an attempt to promote multilateral
governance but to find a substitute unilateralism.
The focus on foreign states as plaintiffs has less force when it
comes to illuminating (or undermining, as Buxbaum hopes)
concerns over sovereigntist imperialism. Consent is critical in
identifying whether U.S. adjudication is a form of sovereigntist
imperialism.22 Consensual adjudication does not infringe on
another state’s sovereignty. At the same time, the existence of
consensual adjudication does not automatically alter the
imperialistic nature of nonconsensual adjudication.23
Consider an analogy from the use of force. In 1781, a French
naval fleet dispelled a British fleet and blockaded the
Chesapeake Bay, pressuring Lord Cornwallis to surrender at
Yorktown and precipitating British recognition of the United
States as an independent sovereign.24 Less than two decades
later, the French navy and French privateers seized American
vessels in an undeclared quasi war with the United States.25 In
both the Revolutionary War and the Quasi War with France, the
United States engaged with French naval power. Yet in the
21. See id. at 696 (“Many of the claims by developing countries [in U.S.
courts] . . . suggest the need to supplement local resources in various ways.“).
22. See id. at 714 & n.264 (noting the importance of consent in
determining whether U.S. adjudication threatens foreign sovereignty).
23. Buxbaum’s suggestion that consensual adjudication should reduce
concerns for nonconsensual adjudication is strongest in the context of “claims in
which foreign governments seek remedies such as treble damages and punitive
damages that they have, in other contexts, criticized as violating their own
public policies.” Buxbaum, supra note 1, at 678. Yet the implications of this rare
opportunistic behavior are uncertain. The most sovereignty-respecting response
would be to allow foreign states to pursue remedies to which they object when
imposed involuntarily. More reasonably, U.S. courts might refuse to grant the
remedies foreign states seek rather than conclude that foreign state pursuit of
the remedies justifies their award against the will of foreign states in other
suits.
24. See, e.g., CHARLES LEE LEWIS, ADMIRAL DEGRASSE AND AMERICAN
INDEPENDENCE xi, 201–02 (2014) (discussing the significance of the French naval
victory and of the Battle of Yorktown); RICHARD M. KETCHUM, VICTORY AT
YORKTOWN 214, 238–40 (2004) (discussing Cornwallis’s surrender in response to
the siege from the army on land and French Navy at sea).
25. See, e.g., Douglad Kroll, Quasi War, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF MILITARY HISTORY 1069 (James C. Bradford ed., 2006) (discussing French
actions against the U.S. during the Quasi War).
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Revolutionary War, the engagement was invited; in the Quasi
War, the engagement was imposed. In the Revolutionary War,
France came to the aid of U.S. sovereignty; in the Quasi War,
France interfered with U.S. sovereignty.
Foreign states’ engagement with U.S. judicial power is
similar. Sometimes foreign states invoke U.S. judicial power to
assist them in disputes with the United States or other entities.
More frequently, foreign states involuntarily face U.S.
adjudication. In both situations, foreign states engage with U.S.
judicial power. But the fact that both scenarios involve
interaction with U.S. judicial power does not mean that they
reflect on foreign state sovereignty in the same way. One scenario
occurs by invitation, the other by imposition. One respects
sovereignty; the other diminishes sovereignty. Just as the fact
that an invitation to France to use naval power to aid the United
States does not lessen the aggressiveness of subsequent French
plundering of U.S. vessels, the invocation of U.S. judicial power
by foreign states does not lessen the threat to sovereignty posed
by involuntary exercise of U.S. judicial power over foreign states.
IV. Reciprocity and its Limits
The threat to sovereignty presented by involuntary
adjudication might be justified by notions of reciprocity, but that
conclusion does not flow inevitably from the observation that
foreign states sometimes invite U.S. adjudication. Reciprocity is a
nuanced principle. For instance, reciprocity may justify burdens
only when a certain threshold of benefits is received. Or
reciprocity may have to bow to other values. The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), for example, eliminates foreign
states’ immunity when the foreign state sues as plaintiff, but only
in that particular suit and only as to counterclaims that are
transactionally related to the claims of the foreign state, seek
remedies that are not different in form or amount from what the
foreign state seeks, or would qualify for an exception to immunity
under some other provision of the FSIA.26Similarly, whether or
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1607(a)–(c). The relevant portion of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act reads,
In any action brought by a foreign state, or in which a foreign state
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not the Due Process Clause applies to foreign states, the Clause
protects a defendant to whom it applies from expansive
assertions of personal jurisdiction even if the defendant has
invoked the power of U.S. courts as a plaintiff in other cases.27 As
these examples illustrate, receipt of judicial benefits does not
necessarily justify judicial burdens. Consistent with this
principle, the fact that foreign states sometimes invoke U.S.
jurisdiction as plaintiffs does not immediately justify U.S.
adjudication against the will of those states. More is needed to
conclude that the sovereignty concerns that accompany
involuntary adjudication are warranted by foreign states’
occasional invocation of U.S. jurisdiction. Foreign Governments as
Plaintiffs stops short of providing that additional justification.
V. Conclusion
At the end of the day, Buxbaum exposes an important
dimension of foreign state engagement with U.S. courts—foreign
states’ voluntary invocation of U.S. jurisdiction as plaintiffs. The
exercise of U.S. jurisdiction in such cases, it turns out, may be a
form of global governance rather than unilateral imperialism.
When it comes to concerns for sovereigntist imperialism,
however, foreign invocation of U.S. jurisdiction fails to undermine
the sovereignty concerns that arise when U.S. courts adjudicate
contrary to the will of foreign states. In those cases, sovereignty
concerns, absent more, continue to counsel against U.S.
adjudication of transnational matters.

intervenes, in a court of the United States or of a State, the foreign
state shall not be accorded immunity with respect to any
counterclaim . . . for which a foreign state would not be entitled to
immunity under section 1605 or 1605A of this chapter had such claim
been brought in a separate action against the foreign state;
or . . . arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the claim of the foreign state; or . . . to the extent that the
counterclaim does not seek relief exceeding in amount or differing in
kind from that sought by the foreign state.
Id.
27.

See generally U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.

